Business Plexus graphic based on publicly reported major strike clusters through June 25, 2026.
Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian infrastructure has moved from occasional spectacle to a sustained military and economic strategy. The most important targets are no longer just air bases or ammunition depots. Increasingly, Ukraine is hitting the facilities that let Russia turn oil into revenue, fuel, diesel, jet fuel, and military logistics.
This article is a catalog of the major recent, publicly reported strikes against Russian oil, fuel, refining, export, and logistics infrastructure. It is not a complete list of every drone, explosion, or sabotage incident. The pace is now too high for that, and both sides have reasons to understate or exaggerate damage. But the pattern is clear: refineries, tank farms, oil terminals, pumping stations, gas infrastructure, and Crimea supply routes have become a central battlefield.
The short version is that Ukraine is trying to make Russia pay twice. First, by destroying or disrupting fuel and export infrastructure. Second, by forcing Moscow to spend air-defense resources protecting refineries, bridges, depots, and industrial sites far from the front.
The strategic logic
Russia's war depends on oil in three ways. It funds the state. It supplies the military. And it keeps the civilian economy functioning well enough for the Kremlin to continue the war without a full domestic shock.
That makes oil infrastructure unusually attractive. A refinery strike can disrupt gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. A depot strike can slow regional distribution. A pumping station strike can affect how crude and refined products move through pipelines. A port or terminal strike can interfere with exports. Even when Russia repairs the damage, the repair process consumes money, specialized parts, engineers, insurance capacity, and air-defense attention.
Those physical targets also connect to Russia's elite economy. Refineries and depots are not abstract pieces of machinery; they sit inside networks of state oil companies, private oil fortunes, logistics contractors, and Kremlin-linked power brokers. For that side of the story, see our related catalog of Russia's wartime power brokers and how they fit into the oil, metals, finance, and infrastructure system.
There is also a political effect. If fuel prices rise, regions ration gasoline, or Moscow has to consider import arrangements and export bans, ordinary Russians begin to feel a war that the Kremlin has tried to keep geographically distant.
Recent strike catalog
The catalog below focuses on the spring and early summer 2026 campaign, when Ukraine's attacks became more frequent, deeper, and more systematic.
| Date or period | Target area | Type of infrastructure | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 2026 | Ust-Luga and Primorsk, Baltic Sea | Oil export terminals | Reuters reporting cited in later summaries described the Baltic port attacks as among the largest Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil export facilities of the war. |
| April 2026 | Tuapse, Perm, Ryazan, Kstovo, Syzran, Volgograd, and other hubs | Refineries and terminals | Ukraine said April deep strikes hit 14 refineries and terminals plus two industrial plants, setting up the even larger May campaign. |
| May 2026 | Tuapse, Perm, Kirishi, Yaroslavl, Astrakhan, Ryazan, Kstovo, Syzran, Novorossiysk, Volna, Vladimir, Moscow Oblast, Volgograd, Saratov, Kirov, Unecha, Taganrog, Feodosiia, Armavir | Refineries, oil depots, terminals, LPDS stations, gas processing | Ukraine's Defense Ministry listed at least 18 major oil refining and fuel logistics targets in May, with combined design refining capacity of more than 110 million tonnes per year. |
| June 3, 2026 | St. Petersburg oil terminal | Oil terminal/export logistics | The strike showed that Ukraine was not limiting attacks to southern Russia or occupied Crimea. Northern export infrastructure also remained vulnerable. |
| June 16 and June 18, 2026 | Moscow Oil Refinery, Kapotnya | Major refinery serving Moscow region | Reuters-carried reporting said the refinery was struck twice and was expected to remain offline for months, with key units accounting for the facility's capacity damaged. |
| June 18, 2026 | Rostov region | Oil depot and bridges | Ukraine said the Moscow attack was accompanied by a strike on a southern Russian oil depot and bridges, part of a broader effort to hamper logistics. |
| June 20, 2026 | Tyumen region, western Siberia | Oil refinery | Zelensky said Ukrainian drones reached an oil refining facility more than 2,000 km from Ukraine, signaling a new depth to the strike campaign. |
| June 19-20, 2026 | Occupied Crimea, including Hlibivka, Simferopol, gas compressor stations, Kerch area | Gas, power, bridge, oil terminal, military logistics | Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces described a middle-strike campaign aimed at isolating Crimea from Russian supply routes. |
| June 25, 2026 | Poltavskaya oil depot, Krasnodar Krai | Diesel and gasoline depot | The SBU described the depot as a large receipt, storage, and shipment facility with a 28-unit tank farm. |
| June 25, 2026 | Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan | Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim and Bashneft-Novoil refineries | The facilities are roughly 1,500 km from Ukraine's eastern border, showing that distance no longer protects Russia's refining hubs. |
| June 25, 2026 | Occupied Crimea | Power plants, oil depot, gas compressor stations, substations, radar, military sites | Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces said 38 sites were targeted across the peninsula, deepening pressure on Russian logistics and civilian fuel availability. |
The May list is the key
The most useful single document for understanding the scale of the campaign is Ukraine's own May summary. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense said that in May 2026 Ukrainian deep-strike operations reached more than ten Russian regions and that the longest-range strike reached 1,700 kilometers from the state border.
The same summary said at least 18 major Russian oil refining and fuel logistics facilities were halted or significantly disrupted in May, with combined design processing capacity above 110 million tonnes of crude oil per year. That does not mean every ton of capacity was permanently destroyed. It means Ukraine was striking a large share of the system's most valuable nodes, repeatedly enough that repair schedules and operational planning become a moving target.
The May list included refineries at Tuapse, Perm, Kirishi, Yaroslavl, Ryazan, Kstovo, Syzran, Volgograd, and Saratov; oil and product terminals around Novorossiysk and Taman; LPDS and pumping stations in Perm, Vladimir, Moscow Oblast, Yaroslavl, and Kirov; the Astrakhan gas processing plant; and regional oil depots in places such as Unecha, Taganrog, Feodosiia, and Armavir.
That is the difference between a raid and a campaign. One refinery fire is a headline. Eighteen oil and fuel logistics targets in a month is an attempt to impose a recurring cost on the Russian war economy.
Moscow was a turning point
The June attacks on Moscow's Kapotnya refinery stand out because they connected the war to the capital's own fuel supply. Reuters reporting carried by Defense News described the June 18 attack as hitting Moscow's refinery for the second time that week, with flames and smoke visible over the southeastern district where the plant is located.
Follow-up Reuters reporting, summarized by the Kyiv Independent and The Moscow Times, said the refinery was unlikely to resume production this year. Industry sources said repairs could take at least six months. The same reporting said one damaged unit accounted for 53 percent of capacity and a second modern unit accounted for the remaining 47 percent.
If those figures hold, the Moscow strike is not merely symbolic. It is a direct hit on a refinery that processed 11.6 million metric tons of crude in 2024 and produced millions of tons of gasoline and diesel. The broader effect is also psychological: if Moscow's own refinery needs additional protection, then every other refinery and depot in Russia has to ask the same question.
Tyumen changed the map
The reported strike on the Tyumen oil refinery in western Siberia pushed the map much farther east. The Guardian reported that Zelensky confirmed a Ukrainian drone attack on an oil refinery more than 2,000 kilometers from Ukraine and said new Ukrainian drones developed by Fire Point could travel more than 3,000 kilometers.
The Kyiv Independent reported that the Tyumen refinery processes about 7.5 million to 9 million metric tons of crude per year and that Ukraine framed the strike as part of its "long-range sanctions" campaign. Russian officials claimed air defenses repelled the attack and that debris fell, a familiar formulation after many Ukrainian strikes. But the bigger issue is the range demonstration: refineries once considered deep rear infrastructure are now within reach.
Crimea is a separate campaign
Ukraine's attacks on Crimea are related to the oil-infrastructure campaign, but they have a slightly different purpose. The goal is not only to burn fuel. It is to isolate the peninsula, degrade Russian air defense and radar coverage, disrupt transport, and make it harder to sustain troops in occupied southern Ukraine.
On June 25, the Kyiv Independent reported that Ukraine struck energy and oil infrastructure as well as military facilities across occupied Crimea. The reported target set included the Tavriya Thermal Power Plant in Simferopol, an oil depot in Dzhankoi, two gas compressor stations, two electrical substations, three coastal radar stations, and an anti-aircraft gun. Ukrainian commander Robert "Madyar" Brovdi said 38 sites were targeted.
That campaign also has visible effects. Russian-installed authorities in Crimea have reported strain on the grid, transportation disruptions, and fuel-sale restrictions. Ukraine's defense leadership has described the goal in plain language: turning Crimea "into an island" by cutting logistics and supply routes.
Why Ukraine can do this more often now
The first reason is range. Ukraine is no longer relying only on scarce Western long-range missiles for deep attacks. It has developed a domestic long-range drone industry, including fixed-wing one-way attack drones that can travel hundreds or thousands of kilometers. The Associated Press reported from inside Fire Point's production network in 2025 that its FP-1 drones could travel up to 1,600 kilometers and were used against oil refineries, arms depots, and other targets. By June 2026, Zelensky was publicly talking about drones capable of reaching 3,000 kilometers.
The second reason is scale. Ukraine has turned drones into an industrial program, not just a battlefield improvisation. Business Insider reported that Zelensky said Ukraine was on track to produce 10 million drones in 2026, up from 4 million in 2025. Most of those are not refinery-strike drones, but the production culture matters. Ukraine now has a dense ecosystem of manufacturers, military users, procurement channels, software teams, volunteer funders, and feedback loops from the front.
The third reason is targeting discipline. Ukraine is not hitting random industrial buildings. The target list tends to cluster around fuel production, military logistics, ports, aviation fuel, pipelines, pumping stations, ammunition, radio electronics, and Crimea supply infrastructure. That suggests a campaign designed around systemic pressure rather than headline value alone.
The fourth reason is Russia's air-defense problem. Russia can defend Moscow, the Kerch Bridge, oil terminals, air bases, missile factories, refineries, border regions, occupied Crimea, and the front line, but it cannot defend all of them perfectly at the same time. Kyiv Independent reporting cited Zelensky as saying Russia had redeployed air defense systems to protect Moscow and the Kerch Bridge, weakening coverage elsewhere. That is exactly the dilemma Ukraine wants to create.
The economic pressure is already visible
The damage is not limited to burnt tanks. The Moscow Times, citing Kommersant and Bloomberg calculations, reported that Ukrainian strikes cost Russia's oil sector more than $13 billion in direct and indirect losses in 2025. The same report said Ukraine carried out 120 attacks on Russian energy facilities that year, including 81 against refineries.
By June 2026, Russian fuel-market stress was becoming harder to dismiss. Reuters-carried reporting said Russia was weighing additional export restrictions, including on diesel, as refinery damage and fuel shortages spread. The Moscow refinery outage alone adds pressure to a system already coping with regional gasoline restrictions, higher prices, and the need to shift supply by rail, truck, or imports.
That does not mean Russia is out of fuel. Russia is a huge oil producer with spare routes, storage, emergency rules, and the ability to prioritize the military over civilian consumers. But the point of Ukraine's campaign is cumulative friction: less refining margin, more regional shortage risk, higher insurance costs, more repairs, more air-defense deployments, more export complications, and less certainty for Russian planners.
What to watch next
The next phase will be judged by repetition. A single successful strike is less important than whether Ukraine can keep returning to the same refinery, hitting replacement equipment, and forcing Russia to keep units offline. Watch for reports of crude distillation units, hydrotreaters, isomerization units, substations, tank farms, loading racks, and pipeline pumping stations. Those are often more important than dramatic video of a fire.
Also watch the geography. If strikes continue beyond the familiar belt of Belgorod, Rostov, Krasnodar, Crimea, and Moscow into places like Bashkortostan, Tyumen, Kirov, Perm, and Leningrad Oblast, then Russia's rear area is no longer a rear area in the old sense. It becomes a defended industrial battlespace.
The central question is whether Ukraine can keep the cost curve moving faster than Russia can repair, harden, disperse, and defend. For now, the answer appears to be that Ukraine has found a real pressure point. It will not win the war by itself, but it is forcing Russia to defend its oil economy as part of the battlefield.
Sources and further reading: Ukraine Ministry of Defense's May deep-strike summary; Kyiv Independent reporting on the June 25 Ufa and Krasnodar strikes, Crimea energy strikes, Tyumen and Crimea strikes, and Moscow refinery outage; Reuters reporting republished by Defense News; The Guardian on the Tyumen strike and 3,000 km drone claims; Associated Press on Fire Point's long-range drone production; and The Moscow Times on reported 2025 oil-sector losses.